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Smith: Access to Treatment in Custody

COMMENT
LOST SOULS: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
DEFICIENCIES IN TREATMENT FOR
PERSONS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS IN
CUSTODY

KATHERINE L. SMITH *
INTRODUCTION
The most recent study performed by the Justice Department’s
Bureau of Justice Statistics revealed that over half of all persons in penal
custody have some form of mental illness, while the rate of mental
illness within the general population is closer to one in ten. 1 This study
also revealed that prison conditions for persons with mental health
problems are quantifiably different than those for persons without mental
problems. 2 For example, inmates with mental illness are twice as likely
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to be injured in fights as compared to those without mental illness. 3
Furthermore, even though all federal prisons and most state prisons and
jails now provide some form of mental health services to inmates, 4 most
inmates with mental illness never receive treatment while in custody. 5 In
fact, less than one quarter of federal inmates and one third of state
inmates with mental health problems receive treatment for their mental
illness. 6 Since mental illness can be exacerbated by prison conditions,
proper diagnosis and treatment are essential for the well-being of persons
with mental illness in custody. 7
This Comment explores systemic deficiencies of access to mental
health care in prison systems and the Eighth Amendment implications of
those deficiencies. Because the Eighth Amendment prohibits, among
other things, infliction of cruel and unusual punishments, when denial of
adequate mental health care results in undue suffering, the conditions of
confinement may violate the Constitution. 8 Therefore, there must be
mechanisms in place to ensure necessary treatment is provided while
protecting individual rights.
Part I of this Comment addresses the duty a state owes to those it
incarcerates (e.g., to provide food, clothing, recreation, education,
medical care) and what standards exist for the provision of reasonable
care and to ensure that prescribed care is in fact delivered. Part I also
summarizes the history of prisoners’ efforts to redress conditions of
confinement and the standards that have developed for constitutional
challenges. Part II focuses on the legal framework for Eighth
Amendment challenges brought by prisoners and how the standard for
evaluating those claims has evolved. Part III explores the problems
persons with mental illness face in challenging the conditions of their
confinement after Estelle v. Gamble, 9 identifies the particular barriers to
Eighth Amendment challenges for persons with mental health problems
created by Farmer v. Brennan, 10 and addresses the tension between
3

Id. (“A larger percentage of inmates who had a mental health problem had been injured in
a fight since admission than those without a mental problem (State prisoners, 20% compared to 10%;
Federal prisoners, 11% compared to 6%; jail inmates, 9% compared to 3%).”).
4
Id. at 9.
5
See id.
6
Id. (“State prisoners who had a mental health problem (34%) had the highest rate of mental
health treatment since admission, followed by Federal prisoners (24%) and local jail inmates
(17%).”).
7
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 53 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.
8
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
9
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
10
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss3/7

2

Smith: Access to Treatment in Custody

2012]

Access to Treatment in Custody

499

providing mental health care to the incarcerated and the right to refuse
treatment. Part IV proposes three systemic changes, applicable to both
prisons and the surrounding legal framework, that address the
deficiencies and disparities in how the needs of inmates with mental
health problems are managed.
I.

HISTORY OF PRISONERS’ RIGHT TO CHALLENGE ASPECTS OF
CONFINEMENT

The Eighth Amendment establishes the constitutional limitations of
imprisonment by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment. 11 When a
person is incarcerated, the incarceration or punishment cannot be grossly
disproportionate to the underlying offense. 12 Gratuitous punishment, that
which inflicts unnecessary pain and suffering on an inmate, or
punishment that results in the deprivation of life violates the Eighth
Amendment. 13 However, the very nature of imprisonment necessitates
conditions that are restrictive and even harsh; thus, conditions must be
below societal standards of decency to raise constitutional concerns. 14
A.

STATES’ DUTY OF CARE TO INMATES

Cruel and unusual punishment—as it relates to conditions of
confinement—has evolved over the course of American history. 15
Throughout American history, legislatures and courts have affirmed that
persons in state custody must be provided basic necessities. 16 Courts
have long held that inmates, whose confinement and resulting
deprivation of liberty prevent them from caring for themselves, are to be

11

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910) (“[I]t is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense.”).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Bowring v.
Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir.
1972)) (U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, makes Eighth Amendment protections applicable to states);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (“[P]unishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.”).
14
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1315-16
(1981); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305 (1991) (“Nothing so amorphous as ‘overall
conditions’ can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when no specific deprivation of a
single human need exists.”).
15
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
16
See, e.g., Miller v. Cnty. of Dickinson, 26 N.W. 31, 32 (Iowa 1885) (“The prisoner being
in the custody of the sheriff, it was the duty of the latter to supply him with the necessaries of life
suitable to his condition . . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:705 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted
as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2837, 3612 (1870)).
12
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given basic necessities. 17 In general, state laws dictated that food,
clothing, and shelter must be supplied to prisoners in custody. 18 Over
time, the definition of necessities broadened to include protection from
abuse and the provision of reasonable medical care. 19 Since the late
1800s, several courts have held that the state is obligated to make
necessary medical treatment available, whether it be in public hospitals
or in prisons. 20 Medical care, as defined by lower courts, includes
treatment for both physical and mental health, but the U.S. Supreme
Court has not specifically addressed the issue of mental health care. 21

17

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-201 (1989);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (citing Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293 (N.C.
1926)).
18
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-6-19 (Westlaw 2011) (originally enacted as ALA. CODE § 243
(1852)); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 33.30.011 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as 1986 Alaska Sess.
Laws, ch. 88, §6); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-7 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 3002 (1949)); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-2 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as
1956 Ga. Laws, No. 112, § 13, at 161, 171); IND. CODE ANN. § 11-10-3-2 (Westlaw 2012)
(originally enacted as 1979 Ind. Acts, P.L. 120, ch. 3, at 487, 508); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:705
(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2837, 3612 (1870)); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 47-1-27(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as MISS. CODE ANN. § 4070 (1930)); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 221.120 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as MO. ANN. STAT. § 9223 (Westlaw 1939));
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-181 (Westlaw 2011) (originally enacted as 1969 Neb. Laws, ch. 817, § 12, at
3071, 3079); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-B:4 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 89:1 (1988)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 34-105 (Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted
as 1987 Okla. Sess. Laws, ch. 80, § 10, at 308, 316); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169.076 (Westlaw
2012) (originally enacted as 1979 Or. Laws, ch. 487, § 6, at 595, 596); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-1-105
(Westlaw 2012) (originally enacted as 1890 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 37, § 5, at 166, 167).
19
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (“The Amendment also imposes duties
on these officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure
that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take reasonable
measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27
(1984)); see also Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31-32 (1993); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 225 (1990); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99.
20
Miller, 26 N.W. at 32; Malone v. Escambia Cnty., 22 So. 503, 504-05 (Ala. 1897); Perkins
v. Grafton Cnty., 29 A. 541, 541 (N.H. 1892); see also Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892, 901 (5th
Cir. 1982); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 654 (7th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1980); Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 286 (5th Cir. 1977) cert. granted
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); Cruz v. Ward, 558 F.2d 658,
661 (2d Cir. 1977); Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Runnels v.
Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220,
221 (4th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293; City of Tulsa v. Hillcrest Med. Ctr., 292
P.2d 430, 432 -33 (Okla. 1956).
21
See Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996); Bowring v. Godwin, 551
F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (citing Newman v. Alabama, 503 F.2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975)). But see Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011) (“Overcrowding has
overtaken the limited resources of prison staff; imposed demands well beyond the capacity of
medical and mental health facilities; and created unsanitary and unsafe conditions that make
progress in the provision of care difficult or impossible to achieve. The overcrowding is the ‘primary
cause of the violation of a Federal right,’ 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(E)(i), specifically the severe and
unlawful mistreatment of prisoners through grossly inadequate provision of medical and mental
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The Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble formally confirmed that a
person in custody must have all basic necessities furnished, including
medical needs. 22 However, courts are generally reluctant to hold that
failure to provide adequate care rises to the level of cruel and unusual
punishment. 23
The minimum standards for providing basic necessities have been
refined over time, which evidences society’s evolving standards of
decency. 24 The standard for adequate medical care is based on
professional judgment that meets minimal expectations of the applicable
profession. 25 For medical care, most illnesses, diseases and injuries are
quantifiable and objectively diagnosable. 26
However, when the
diagnosis is subjective, doctors are given discretion unless their conduct
is deemed malicious. 27 Therefore, for persons with mental illness where
the diagnoses are almost exclusively subjective, 28 proving a failure to

health care.”). In Brown v. Plata, overcrowding was the dominant cause for several systemic Eighth
Amendment violations, but the Court also alluded to mental health care.
22
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103-04 (“The infliction of such unnecessary suffering [by denying
medical care] is inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern
legislation codifying the common-law view that ‘(i)t is but just that the public be required to care for
the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself.’” (quoting
Spicer, 132 S.E. at 293)).
23
See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating that Eighth Amendment is
implicated by the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’” and not an “‘inadvertent failure to
provide adequate medical care’” (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 105)); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106
(“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful
to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.”); Talal v. White, 403 F.3d 423, 426
(6th Cir. 2005) (requiring that the prisoner demonstrate more than “mere discomfort or
inconvenience”); Bowring, 551 F.2d at 48; Haskew v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir.
1970) (per curiam); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981) (noting the scope of
successful confinement challenges is limited to “deprivations of essential food, medical care, or
sanitation” or “conditions intolerable for prison confinement”); Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863,
867 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm.” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)); Wood v. Housewright, 900
F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating there is no Eighth Amendment violation if the delay in
treatment does not cause substantial harm); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754,
762 (3d Cir. 1979).
24
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
25
See, e.g., McKee-Bey v. Mitchell, 259 F. App’x 880, 883 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating prisoners
are entitled to minimal expectations of a doctor’s profession, and no constitutional violation exists if
the doctor has met this minimum standard of medical care); Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg,
903 F.2d 274, 278 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[A]s long as a physician exercises professional judgment his
behavior will not violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.”).
26
See, e.g., Robert A. Aronowitz, When Do Symptoms Become a Disease?, 134 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 803, 803 (2001).
27
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (“When prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated.”).
28
Mary Boyle, The Problem with Diagnosis, 20 PSYCHOLOGIST 290, 290 (2007).
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diagnose and treat illness requires a more exacting standard than for
failure to treat objectively discernible physical ailments.
Although prisoners have challenged everything from the type of
food served to inadequate hygiene care, 29 the standards that courts have
imposed on prisons for providing essential care are implemented only
when there are systemic deficiencies that have repeatedly failed to be
mitigated. 30 Traditionally, courts have deferred to prison institutions to
create their own standards and to deal with challenges on an
individualized basis. 31 This deference was codified in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 32 In rare cases in which prisoners have
successfully complained of systemic problems, courts have generally
ordered plaintiffs and defendants to develop a remedial plan to address
the constitutional violations. 33
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO CHALLENGE CONSTITUTIONAL
VIOLATIONS DURING CONFINEMENT

Before the 1964 Supreme Court ruling in Cooper v. Pate, 34
prisoners had little recourse to challenge the conditions of their
confinement, 35 despite the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment, because challenges were limited to the sentencing
and punishment phase. 36 In Cooper, an inmate made a novel challenge
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he was denied access to Muslim reading

29

See, e.g., Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 255 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that denying a
prisoner toothpaste for 337 days, resulting in gum disease and tooth extraction, “bespeaks an
indifference to basic hygiene needs”); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971)
(evaluating a disciplinary bread-and-water diet and determining it to be “inconsistent with current
minimum standards of respect for human dignity”).
30
See Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D. Pa. 1980);
Feliciano v. Barcelo, 497 F. Supp. 14, 33-35 (D.P.R. 1979).
31
See Haskew v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
32
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012).
33
See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1283 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Ruiz v. Estelle,
503 F. Supp. 1265, 1390 (S.D. Tex. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Carr v. Newcomer, No.
09-1080, 2009 U.S. Dist. Lexis 123559, at *22-23 (W.D. La. Dec. 21, 2009). But see Feliciano, 497
F. Supp. at 40 (where conditions were so unsanitary and dangerous to health and life, the court made
an emergency order with detailed and specific remedial measures).
34
Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
35
See Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (1871) (“The bill of rights is a declaration
of general principles to govern a society of freemen, and not of convicted felons and men civilly
dead.”).
36
Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951) (“[I]t is well settled that it is not
the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries,
but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined.”); see also Sarshik v.
Sanford, 142 F.2d 676, 676 (5th Cir. 1944) (per curiam); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir.
1944).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol42/iss3/7

6

Smith: Access to Treatment in Custody

2012]

Access to Treatment in Custody

503

material. 37 Section 1983 provides that no person may, under color of
law, deprive another person of constitutional rights and privileges. 38 The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the
defendant’s 39 motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. 40 However, the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the inmate’s allegations that prison officials denied him
permission to purchase religious publications and denied other privileges
enjoyed by other prisoners stated a viable cause of action. 41 Although
this was a challenge based on a violation of the First Amendment, it
opened the door for challenges based on other constitutional violations
occurring during confinement, including Eighth Amendment
violations. 42 This significant holding departed from prior decisions that
limited a prisoner’s redress for Eighth Amendment violations to acts
prior to confinement. 43
Since Cooper, there have been scores of § 1983 claims alleging
violations of the Eighth Amendment. 44 Several of these cases exposed

37

Cooper alleged the warden and others “denied permission to purchase and read Arabic and
Swahili grammar books, from which Cooper hopes to learn to read Islamic works in the original;
have denied permission to purchase and read the Koran; have denied permission to consult with
ministers of his faith; have refused to allow Cooper and other inmates of his faith to attend religious
services in their faith.” Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518, 520 (7th Cir. 1967).
38
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2012) (“Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or
omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered
to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”).
39
The defendant was the warden of the state penitentiary.
40
Cooper v. Pate, 324 F.2d 165, 166-67 (7th Cir. 1963); see Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546,
546 (1964) (per curiam).
41
See Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546.
42
Section 1983 has also been used to address violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (prison
inmate labor union brought § 1983 claim against prison officials challenging regulations that
prohibited inmates from soliciting other inmates to join the union as a violation of First Amendment
rights); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (inmates alleged that procedures used in prison
disciplinary proceedings violated their rights to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
43
See Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951); Sarshik v. Sanford, 142 F.2d
676, 676 (5th Cir. 1944); Kelly v. Dowd, 140 F.2d 81, 83 (7th Cir. 1944).
44
See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 n.14 (1973) (noting

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012

7

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 7

504

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

conditions so deplorable that Congress enacted the Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act in 1976. 45 This Act authorized the
Attorney General to bring suits in federal court on behalf of persons
The Civil Rights of
institutionalized by the United States. 46
Institutionalized Persons Act and subsequent litigation resulted in
dramatic improvements in prison conditions. 47
During this influx of § 1983 cases, the Supreme Court made
significant holdings that affected the rights of prisoners with mental
illness. In Vitek v. Jones, the Court declared unconstitutional a state
statute that permitted the prison director to transfer a prisoner to a mental
hospital for involuntary commitment if a psychologist found the prisoner
to be mentally ill and could not be properly treated in prison. 48 The
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s holding, stating that the
transfer was “qualitatively different” from the punishment for the crime
and required additional due process protections to comply with the
Fourteenth Amendment. 49 Although grounded in due process, this case
was important because the Court addressed the issue of persons with
mental illness while in custody. In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court
acknowledged the common-law tradition that a prison owes a duty to
provide medical care to those in custody and stated that failure to do so
could “result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve
any penological purpose. The infliction of such unnecessary suffering is
inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency . . . .” 50
While many cases advanced reform of prison conditions and many
problems uncovered by prison litigation were addressed, the trend was
not unidirectional because the courts became overwhelmed with prison

civil rights prisoner petitions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had tripled from 1,072 to 3,348 from 1968 to
1973).
45
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997 et seq. (Westlaw 2012).
46
Id.
47
The Conference Committee noted that, as a result of litigation in which the Justice
Department had participated, “conditions have improved significantly in dozens of institutions
across the Nation: . . . barbaric treatment of adult and juvenile prisoners has been curbed; . . . and
States facing the prospect of suit by the Attorney General have voluntarily upgraded conditions in
their institutions . . . to comply with previously announced constitutional standards.” H.R. REP. NO.
96-897, at 9 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.A.A.N. 787, 833.
48
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
49
Id. at 493-94 (“A criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an
individual’s right to freedom from confinement for the term of his sentence, but they do not
authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject him to involuntary psychiatric
treatment without affording him additional due process protections.”). The due process protections
included notice, a hearing before an independent decisionmaker, submission of evidence that formed
the basis for the determination, and access to assistance for the prisoner. Id. at 496-97.
50
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citation omitted).
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reform cases. 51 Even though vindication of a prisoner’s constitutional
rights based on conditions of confinement only became possible in the
second half of the twentieth century, the ability to successfully challenge
violations of these rights has since been limited by the Supreme Court
and Congress.
C.

CHANGING DIRECTION: FROM PROMOTING TO RESTRICTING
PRISONER LITIGATION

Within twenty years of providing prisoners a method for redress, the
Supreme Court and Congress both acted to limit prisoner cases. 52 The
Supreme Court attempted to moderate the amount of prisoner cases in
Turner v. Safley, 53 by declaring, “[W]hen a prison regulation impinges
on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.” 54 Turner was a significant
turning point in prison litigation. By adopting a rational-basis standard
of review, the Supreme Court established that courts must show
deference toward prison officials and policies when evaluating alleged
constitutional violations. 55 Nearly a decade after Turner, Congress also
acted to curtail prison cases by passing the Prison Litigation Reform Act
of 1995. 56 This Act promotes Turner-style deference to the impact on
operations when assessing violations, restricts the injunctive relief a
court may grant for constitutional violations based on prison conditions,
and requires that any relief given be as narrow as possible while still
correcting the violation. 57 Together, Turner and the Prison Litigation

51

See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1692 (2003) (indicating
that before the passage of the Prison Reform Litigation Act suits brought by inmates outnumbered
non-inmate suits).
52
The Court provided a method for redress via § 1983 with Cooper in 1964 and restricted
redress in Turner v. Safley in 1987, whereas the legislature provided redress with the Civil Rights of
Institutional Persons Act in 1976 and limited redress with the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 1995.
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); 18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012).
53
Turner, 482 U.S. 78.
54
Id. at 89.
55
Id. (“In our view, such a standard is necessary if ‘prison administrators . . . , and not the
courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations.’” (quoting Jones v.
N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977))).
56
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626 (Westlaw 2012).
57
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (Westlaw 2012) (“Prospective relief in any civil action with
respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the
Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any
prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse
impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.”).
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Reform Act created substantial impediments for prison condition
challenges.
II.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EIGHTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES:
THE ESTELLE TEST

In addition to Turner and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court in Estelle v. Gamble established a standard with two distinct
hurdles an inmate must overcome to prevail on an Eighth Amendment
challenge. 58 In Estelle, the Court created a two-part test to establish a
cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim. The test requires that (1) there has
been a serious medical need, illness or injury, and (2) the defendant (state
actor in claims brought under § 1983) has been deliberately indifferent. 59
Although the Supreme Court did not define “serious medical need,”
several courts utilize the definition provided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Monmouth County Correctional
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro. 60 In this post-Estelle case, an inmate
was prevented from terminating her pregnancy by systemic procedural
delays. 61 Based on the principle that a serious medical need is “one that
has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so
obvious that a lay-person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention,” the court held that the delay in access to abortion
services constituted deliberate indifference to medical needs. 62
Other courts use the definition provided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in McGuckin v. Smith, where a prisoner
brought suit after he failed to receive treatment for a massive herniation
of his back for over three years. 63 The court held that a serious medical

58

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
Id. at 103-04.
60
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)
(“A medical need is serious . . . if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring
treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a
doctor’s attention.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.,
390 F.3d 890, 896-97 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir.
1996) (same); Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990)
(same).
61
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates, 834 F.2d at 347.
62
Id.
63
McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992) (“A ‘serious’ medical need
exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’. . . . The existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor
or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical
condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and
substantial pain are examples of indications that a prisoner has a ‘serious’ need for medical
treatment.”), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
59
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need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain. 64 The prisoner’s condition was considered severe, and the court
stated that “the woefully inadequate medical treatment” may well have
been the basis for a valid § 1983 claim. 65
The second half of the Estelle test considers the culpable state of
mind of the defendant prison official or doctor. 66 The Supreme Court
adopted the term “deliberate indifference” to classify the type of
disregard or denial of serious medical needs, illness or injury of prisoners
that violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. 67 The Court noted that acts or omissions by prison
officials must be sufficiently harmful to show a deliberate indifference
that offends the standards of decency. 68 Lower courts uniformly
interpreted “deliberate indifference” to be measured under a recklessness
standard; however, a split arose over how recklessness was to be
determined. Some courts held that if the harm was sufficiently severe,
such that it would be apparent to a reasonable person, then subjective
knowledge could be imputed to the prison official. 69 However, other
courts held that the recklessness standard required knowledge of the
severe condition and the appropriate means to treat the condition, and the

1997); see also Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997); Chance v. Armstrong, 143
F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998); Riddle, 83 F.3d at 1202.
64
McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1059-60.
65
Id. at 1062-63. The prisoner’s claim ultimately failed because he filed suit against a prison
medical doctor and a private orthopedic specialist who were not responsible for his care until seven
months before he had surgery, and nothing in the record indicated either named defendant had
anything to do with delaying treatment. Id.
66
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1976).
67
Id. at 104-05 (“We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response
to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical
care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced,
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under s 1983.”
(citation and footnotes omitted)).
68
Id. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. It is
only such indifference that can offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.”).
69
Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Similarly, a prison official who
acts with deliberate or callous indifference toward inmates violates the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. A plaintiff can show deliberate indifference by proving that the prison
official acted with actual intent or recklessness. A defendant acts recklessly when he disregards a
substantial risk of danger that either is known to him or would be apparent to a reasonable person in
his position.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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refusal or prevention of treatment. 70 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme
Court clarified that the recklessness standard is akin to criminal
negligence, such that there must be actual, subjective awareness of the
risk of harm. 71
After Turner, Estelle, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
bringing a successful Eighth Amendment claim is more difficult: the
available remedies are narrower, and the process of obtaining redress is
more protracted. 72
III. PROGRESSION OF “DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE” ANALYSIS AND THE
ABILITY OF PRISONERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS TO CHALLENGE THE
CONDITIONS OF THEIR CONFINEMENT
A.

EVOLUTION OF THE ESTELLE TEST

Since Estelle, several Supreme Court cases have considered
challenges to prison conditions and specific harmful acts under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. These noteworthy cases explain the ongoing evolution of the
criteria for “deliberate indifference” applied to prisoners’ Eighth
Amendment challenges. 73
In Rhodes v. Chapman, an inmate challenged the practice of doublecelling inmates to handle overcrowded prisons and claimed this practice
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 74 Although the Supreme
Court held that the specific conditions in this particular prison did not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation, the Court acknowledged that
harsh conditions of confinement may constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 75 Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion went into great
detail about the sordid history of prison conditions and the essential role
of judicial scrutiny to ameliorate the constitutional violations of such

70

LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Because the Eighth
Amendment requires a subjective standard, to demonstrate an official’s deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff must prove that the official possessed knowledge both of the infirm condition and of the
means to cure that condition, so that a conscious, culpable refusal to prevent the harm can be
inferred from the defendant’s failure to prevent it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836-37 (1994).
72
See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011).
73
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Farmer, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v. McKinney,
509 U.S. 25 (1993); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294
(1991); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986); Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
74
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 340.
75
Id. at 347.
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conditions. 76 Rhodes clarified that deliberate indifference could include
a failure to address prison conditions. 77 By recognizing that the Eighth
Amendment covers more than specific harmful acts toward prisoners and
may include prison conditions, 78 the Court broadened the umbrella of the
deliberate-indifference standard to encompass systemic conditions as
well as practices.
Similarly, in Wilson v. Seiter, a prisoner brought a § 1983 claim
alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations because the
cumulative conditions of the prison 79 constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 80 The prisoner asserted that after he provided notice of the
conditions to the defendants, 81 they failed to take remedial action. 82 The
Court modified its holding in Rhodes and held that a challenge to prison
conditions must prove a deprivation of a specific and identifiable human
need. 83
The Wilson Court also addressed a question that had developed
from its holding in Whitley v. Albers, in which an Eighth Amendment
challenge was brought by a prisoner who was shot by a guard during an
attempt to quell a disturbance. 84 In Whitley, the Supreme Court focused
on the culpability prong of the Estelle test rather than severity of the
injury, by considering the situation the official faced when the injury
occurred. 85 The Court held that express intent to inflict pain is not
required, but in a situation where prison officials are attempting to
restore discipline, there must be a showing of bad faith or malicious
conduct for the purpose of causing harm. 86 The Wilson Court also
clarified that the “obduracy, wantonness, or intent to cause harm”

76

Id. at 353-364 (Brennan, J, concurring).
Id. at 347 (majority opinion).
78
Id.
79
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991). The prisoner complained about overcrowding,
excessive noise, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate
restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing physically and mentally ill
inmates with the general prison population. Id.
80
Id.
81
Defendants were the director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections and the
prison warden.
82
Wilson, 501 U.S. at 296.
83
Id. at 304.
84
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
85
Id. at 320-21.
86
Id. (“Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a disturbance, such as
occurred in this case, that indisputably poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff, we think the question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and
suffering ultimately turns on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
77
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standard used in Whitley did not apply to prison condition cases, and the
more lenient “deliberate indifference” standard was the proper standard
to apply. 87 Moreover, the Court clarified that a cruel-and-unusualpunishment inquiry was not limited to the objective component, even
though Rhodes turned on the objective portion of the inquiry. 88 Thus, a
court considering a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim must ask
whether the alleged wrongdoing was objectively “harmful enough” 89 to
establish a constitutional violation, and whether “the officials act[ed]
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” 90
The Court extended Whitley in the case Hudson v. McMillian, where
an inmate brought an Eighth Amendment challenge claiming that a
beating he received while in restraints constituted excessive force and
cruel and unusual punishment. 91 The Court held that if the injury was
not severe, there could still be a viable Eighth Amendment challenge. 92
Distinguishing Whitley, in which the officials were attempting to quell a
disturbance, the Hudson Court noted that the prisoner was restrained and
there were no exigent circumstances requiring the restoration of order. 93
However, even using the Whitley standard would yield the same
conclusion, because the objective component of the inquiry is contextual
and responsive to contemporary standards of decency. 94 “When prison
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,
contemporary standards of decency always are violated,” regardless of
the extent of injury sustained. 95
The harm element from the first prong of the Estelle test was
broadened to include latent effects of prison conditions in Helling v.
McKinney, in which a prisoner brought a challenge based on being
subjected to second-hand tobacco smoke. 96 The prisoner claimed that
the prison officials were deliberately indifferent to the fact that they were
jeopardizing his health, even though he had no current injury. 97 The
Court rejected the contention that only deliberate indifference to
“current” serious health problems of inmates is actionable under the

87

Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302.
Id. at 298.
89
Id. at 303.
90
Id. at 298.
91
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992).
92
Id. at 7.
93
Id. at 6-7.
94
Id. at 7-8.
95
Id. at 9.
96
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 27 (1993). The prisoner was assigned to a cell with
another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes a day. Id.
97
Id. at 27-28.
88
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Eighth Amendment. 98 Although the Court remanded to permit the
inmate an opportunity to prove his claim, it noted that the objective and
subjective components of deliberate indifference would be difficult to
establish. 99 If a person has been exposed to a risk of harm that she or he
alleges is cruel and unusual punishment, the court must “assess whether
society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave
that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk.” 100 For the subjective element, the Court
noted that deliberate indifference “should be determined in light of the
prison authorities’ current attitudes and conduct” to demonstrate that
prison authorities are ignoring the possible dangers posed by a particular
condition. 101
In Farmer v. Brennan, the Supreme Court resolved a conflict that
had developed among the circuits when applying the deliberateindifference standard. 102 A transwoman with breast implants and taking
hormones was placed with the male general population, where she was
allegedly raped and beaten in her cell by another inmate. 103 She claimed
that the officials were deliberately indifferent to her safety because of
their knowledge that she would be particularly vulnerable to sexual
attacks. 104 The Court held that because the Eighth Amendment prohibits
the infliction of cruel and unusual “punishment,” the classification of
deliberate indifference necessitates a subjective standard in order to
determine if an act or omission constitutes punishment. 105 Although the
Court acknowledged that being violently assaulted in prison is not “part
of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society,” without subjective knowledge (akin to criminal recklessness)
there could not be a finding of deliberate indifference. 106 The Court went
on to explain that the culpability requirement necessitates that the official
“knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
98

Id. at 34.
Id. at 36-37.
100
Id. at 36.
101
Id. at 36-37.
102
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994); compare Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351,
360-61 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding deliberate indifference occurs when an official “knows or should
have known of a sufficiently serious danger to an inmate”), with McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d
344, 348 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding that “deliberate indifference” requires a “subjective standard of
recklessness”).
103
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 829-31.
104
Id. at 831.
105
Id. at 837.
106
Id. at 834 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)); Farmer, 511 U.S. at
837.
99
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drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” 107
In Hope v. Pelzer, an inmate brought suit against prison guards,
alleging that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated
when he was handcuffed to a hitching post while in leg restraints and left
there for several hours without regular water or bathroom breaks. 108 The
Court noted this was not an emergency situation, as in Whitley, and
despite this, the prison officials “knowingly subjected him to a
substantial risk of physical harm.” 109 Applying the subjective standard
elucidated in Farmer, the Court explained that “[w]e may infer the
existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of
harm is obvious.” 110 Unfortunately, the Court did not indicate why the
facts were obvious and sufficient to establish subjective knowledge, a
point noted by the dissenting opinion. 111
Through case law, the Supreme Court has clarified that a viable
claim may be based on prison officials’ deliberate indifference to both
current conditions of confinement and the risk of future harm. However,
because Farmer requires subjective knowledge of the condition or risk of
harm, or harm so obvious that subjective knowledge can be imputed,
persons with mental illness are rarely able to establish deliberate
indifference despite the severity of their suffering. 112
B.

NECESSITY OF PROVIDING TREATMENT VERSUS RIGHT TO REFUSE
TREATMENT

In the 1970s, several lower courts held that prisons have a duty to
provide access to psychiatric treatment. 113 However, in the post-Farmer
and post-Prison Litigation Reform Act era, few challenges have
produced a vindication of rights for persons with mental illness.
107

Id. at 837.
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
109
Id. at 738.
110
Id. (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842).
111
Hope, 536 U.S. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“What is ‘obvious,’ however, is that the
Court’s explanation of how respondents violated the Eighth Amendment is woefully incomplete.”).
112
See Lori A. Marschke, Comment, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for
Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 523-28 (2004).
113
See Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Court, 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th Cir. 1994)
(“[P]sychological needs may constitute serious medical needs.”); Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v.
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding that failure to provide necessary psychological
treatment to inmates with serious mental or emotional disturbances states a claim of deliberate
indifference); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that the law recognizes
no distinction between physical and psychological medical services); see also Partridge v. Two
Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182, 1187 (5th Cir. 1986) (“A serious medical need may exist
for psychological or psychiatric treatment, just as it may exist for physical ills.”).
108
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Additionally, many courts struggle with problems that arise when an
inmate with mental illness asserts the constitutional right to refuse
treatment. 114
As high as the bar is for stating an Eighth Amendment claim based
on improper medical care, the bar is even higher for persons with mental
illness. 115 There are no established criteria to determine what constitutes
adequate mental health care, including mental health evaluations, which
presents a significant difficulty in access to treatment. 116 The Seventh
Circuit determined that while measures such as professional health or
suicide-risk evaluations after initial screening are desirable, they are not
mandatory to establish constitutionally acceptable mental health care
policies. 117 As a result, access to a trained professional—who may be
the only one to find that a serious mental health need is sufficiently
obvious—is blocked because consistent requirements for regular
evaluations have not been established.
Moreover, there is a natural tension between providing inmates with
their mental health needs and their right to refuse treatment. Even when
inmates have access to adequate care, often the result is to prescribe
medications rather than to provide therapy or other forms of treatment. 118
Inmates have the right to refuse medications, but that right may be
overcome (and medication forced) if there is a safety or security risk. 119
114

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 523-28.
116
Fred Cohen, Captives’ Legal Right to Mental Health Care, 17 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 8
(1993) (“Without some anterior duty to diagnose—screen or classify are acceptable nearsynonyms—then the right to care is a virtual nullity.”).
117
See Estate of Novack ex rel. Turbin v. Cnty. of Wood, 226 F.3d 525, 532 (7th Cir. 2000).
But see Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on
other grounds, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1982) (outlining six requirements to meet the minimum
standard of constitutionally adequate care as follows: (1) The prison must have a systematic program
of screenings and evaluations of prisoners in order to identify those who need mental health
treatment; (2) Treatment for a prisoner must entail more than just segregation and close supervision;
(3) The prison must employ enough trained mental health professionals to be able to identify and
treat those suffering from serious mental disorders the in an individualized manner; (4) Accurate,
complete, and confidential records of the mental health treatment process must be maintained; (5) It
is an unacceptable method of treatment to prescribe and administer “behavior-altering medications in
dangerous amounts, by dangerous methods, or without acceptable supervision and periodic
evaluation;” and (6) As a necessary component of any mental health treatment program, the prison
must have a basic program for the identification, treatment, and supervision of suicidal prisoners).
118
See DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH
PROBLEMS
OF
PRISON
AND
JAIL
INMATES
1,
8-9
(2006),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S.
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 115-17 (2003), available at
www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.
119
Compare Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990), with Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 223 (1990).
115
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In Washington v. Harper, the Court concluded that when safety or
security is in jeopardy, a state law authorizing involuntary treatment
amounted to a constitutionally permissible “accommodation between an
inmate’s liberty interest in avoiding the forced administration of
antipsychotic drugs and the State’s interests in providing appropriate
medical treatment to reduce the danger that an inmate suffering from a
serious mental disorder represents to himself or others.” 120 In Riggins v.
Nevada, the Court repeated that an individual has a constitutionally
protected liberty “interest in avoiding involuntary administration of
antipsychotic drugs,” which only an “essential” or “overriding” state
interest might overcome. 121
Although the Supreme Court has consistently held that prison
officials may forcibly treat a mentally ill inmate with antipsychotic drugs
only when “the inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the
treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest,” 122 the Court’s holding in
Sell v. United States clarifies the procedural safeguards that balance
competing interests between the state and the inmate when danger to self
or others is not the case. 123 In Sell, the Court revisited the issue of a
person’s right to refuse treatment while in custody and when that right
must yield. 124 Mr. Sell was ordered by the magistrate to be hospitalized
for treatment after a competency hearing that resulted in a finding that
Sell was “mentally incompetent to stand trial.” 125 The purpose of the
treatment was to determine whether there was a substantial probability
that Sell would attain the capacity for his trial to proceed. 126 While in
custody, the medical center staff recommended that Sell take
antipsychotic medication but he refused. 127 Medical center authorities
decided to allow involuntary medication, which Sell challenged in
court. 128 The Court held that when an inmate does not pose a danger, the
right to refuse treatment provides significant protections; the Court
established the following guidelines:
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at
stake. . . .
Second, the court must conclude that involuntary
medication will significantly further those concomitant state

120

Harper, 494 U.S. at 236.
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134, 135 (1992).
122
Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
123
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
124
Id.
125
Id. at 171.
126
Id. at 170-71.
127
Id. at 171.
128
Id. at 172.
121
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interests. . . . Third, the court must conclude that involuntary
medication is necessary to further those interests. The court must find
that any alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve
substantially the same results. . . . Fourth, as we have said, the court
must conclude that administration of the drugs is medically
appropriate, i.e., in the patient’s best medical interest in light of his
medical condition. The specific kinds of drugs at issue may matter
here as elsewhere. Different kinds of antipsychotic drugs may
129
produce different side effects and enjoy different levels of success.

The Court distinguished between when it is justifiable to involuntarily
medicate for purposes related to the inmate’s dangerousness and when
refusal to take drugs puts the inmate’s health gravely at risk. 130
However, the Court recently denied certiorari for an inmate who
claimed prison officials imposed sanctions because he refused his HIV
medications in protest against being transferred to a particular prison
facility. 131 Subsequently, he was subjected to hard labor in 100-degree
heat despite repeated requests for lighter duty more appropriate
considering his medical condition. 132 Thus, the question remains
unresolved whether there can be an Eighth Amendment challenge for
punitive reactions to prisoners refusing treatment. 133
For persons with mental illness, much of the care is dependent on an
accurate diagnosis, but symptoms may present differently at times, and
many diagnoses have similar or overlapping features with other
diagnoses. 134 Furthermore, persons with mental illness often have
However,
varying diagnoses from different clinical providers. 135
clinicians who are trained in recognizing and diagnosing mental illness
are better able to identify signs and symptoms that require acute care. 136
Unlike prison officials who have no diagnostic training, medical
professionals would have the requisite knowledge to satisfy the
subjective prong of the deliberate-indifference test.

129

Id. at 180-81.
Id. at 181-82.
131
Pitre v. Cain, 131 S. Ct. 8 (2010).
132
Id. at 8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
133
See id. at 9.
134
M. Katherine Shear et al., Diagnosis of Nonpsychotic Patients in Community Clinics, 157
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 581, 581-87 (2000); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL (4th ed. 2000).
135
Shear et al., Diagnosis of Nonpsychotic Patients in Community Clinics, 157 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY at 581.
136
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS 1, 103 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.
130
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If an inmate cannot rely on diagnosis or treatment because she or he
lacks access to mental health professionals, the only option remaining to
prove deliberate indifference is to establish that the suffering is so
obvious a reasonable person could easily recognize the need for medical
attention. 137 Unfortunately, for persons with mental illness, there may be
no easily discernible symptom for the layperson to recognize even when
the internal suffering is quite severe. 138 Given the difficulty for an
untrained person to detect mental illness, as compared to a physical
illness, a court may determine that a prison official is not deliberately
indifferent to a prisoner’s serious mental health need because that need is
not sufficiently obvious to the prison official. 139 Additionally, prison
security personnel would not easily detect mental illness because they are
not adequately trained to recognize the symptoms that require psychiatric
care. 140 The result of this inability of prison officials to detect mental
suffering is that inmates may have severe suffering without the ability to
prove deliberate indifference.
C.

IMPACT OF FARMER’S SUBJECTIVE STANDARD ON THE OPERATION
OF PRISONS

The Supreme Court in Farmer indicated that it was not concerned
that the subjective standard would promote indifference to the health and
safety needs of inmates. 141 However, since Farmer, very few prison
officials have been held liable under § 1983 despite deplorable
conditions and treatment. 142 This result raises the question: Does
Farmer’s subjective standard promote indifference? 143 Several scholars
who have addressed this question recommend abandoning Farmer’s

137

See Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS at 75-76.
139
See Christy P. Johnson, Mental Health Care Policies in Jail Systems: Suicide and the
Eighth Amendment, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1227, 1251 (2002) (“Courts may reason that, because
mental illness affects the mind rather than the body, a layperson may not be able to identify a mental
illness.”).
140
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS at 76; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 n.3 (1976).
141
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 (1994) (“We doubt that a subjective approach will
present prison officials with any serious motivation to take refuge in the zone between ignorance of
obvious risks and actual knowledge of risks.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142
See STOP PRISONER RAPE, IN THE SHADOWS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN U.S. DETENTION
FACILITIES, A SHADOW REPORT TO THE U.N. COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE 1, 19 (2006),
available at www.justdetention.org/pdf/in_the_shadows.pdf (“[T]he standard established under
Farmer v. Brennan is so difficult to meet that few plaintiffs have been successful.”).
143
See id. (stating that Farmer’s subjective “standard also creates a perverse incentive for
prison officials to deliberately ignore what is happening in their facilities”).
138
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subjective standard in favor of an objective standard. 144 However, this
proposal is unworkable for persons with mental illness, because clinical
assessment is subjective. The very issues that make deliberate
indifference difficult to prove under a subjective standard will not be
alleviated for persons with mental illness by using an objective standard.
There are great discrepancies among clinicians in assessment and
diagnoses, because the mental health assessment includes current
symptoms that manifest differently for different people. 145 Therefore, an
objective standard of what a reasonable person would do is, in effect,
more difficult to apply than a subjective standard of what was actually
known.
However, despite the rational justification for a subjective standard
to determine deliberate indifference, in practice, prison officials
untrained in mental assessments must decide whom to refer to
clinicians. 146 For the subjective standard of Farmer to have some
practical meaning as it relates to persons with mental illness, there must
be some mechanism in place to ensure access to treatment. Necessity of
medical treatment can best be determined by medical professionals, not
prison officials. Given that the nature of confinement prevents inmates
from caring for themselves, and that prison officials cannot be
deliberately indifferent to mental conditions they cannot detect, prison
staff needs to be adequately trained to recognize symptoms that require
referral for psychiatric treatment. 147

144

See, e.g., Katherine Robb, What We Don’t Know Might Hurt Us: Subjective Knowledge
and the Eighth Amendment’s Deliberate Indifference Standard for Sexual Abuse in Prisons, 65
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 705, 711-15 (2010); Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and
the Eighth Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 948-54 (2009); Lori A. Marschke, Comment,
Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
487, 528-32 (2004).
145
PAULA T. TRZEPACZ & ROBERT W. BAKER, THE PSYCHIATRIC MENTAL STATUS
EXAMINATION (1993).
146
See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 523; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 110 n.3 (1976)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“When ill, the prisoner’s point of contact with a prison’s health care
program is the sick-call line. Access may be barred by a guard, who refuses to give the convict a
hospital pass out of whimsy or prejudice, or in light of a history of undiagnosed complaints.”)
(quoting Health Law Project, Univ. of Pa., Health Care and Conditions in Pa’s State Prisons, in AM.
BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON CORR. FACILITIES AND SERVS., MEDICAL AND HEALTH CARE IN JAILS,
PRISONS, AND OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES: A COMPILATION OF STANDARDS AND MATERIALS
71, 81-82 (1974)).
147
See HOLLY HILLS ET AL., NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, EFFECTIVE PRISON
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES: GUIDELINES TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE TREATMENT 6 (2004),
available at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/018604.pdf (“Illnesses such as schizophrenia,
schizoaffective disorder, and major depression may affect inmates’ ability to care for themselves and
to comply with certain orders or procedures. People with major depression or bipolar disorder may
exhibit aggression or irritability. Paranoia may result in an inmate’s failure to relate well to others.
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IV. PROPOSAL TO AMELIORATE BARRIERS PERSONS WITH MENTAL
ILLNESS FACE IN REDRESSING SEVERE AND UNTREATED MENTAL
SUFFERING WHILE IN CUSTODY
A.

TRACKING MENTAL HEALTH

From the initial interaction with police prior to arrest through entry
into prison custody, there are numerous opportunities to identify
behavior that is indicative of mental illness. Often, police make a field
assessment at the time of the arrest that indicates the presence of
symptoms of mental health problems. 148 Some police, trained to provide
crisis intervention services, act as liaisons with local mental health
services rather than making arrests. This process is known as
diversion. 149 Additionally, many states authorize pre-arraignment mental
health examinations to determine if diversion is preferable. 150 Once a
person is in police custody, for the purposes of arraignment, the
magistrate may consider the person’s mental health when determining
bail. 151 Individuals in jail awaiting trial may exhibit signs of mental
illness after confinement. Mental health assessments can also occur
before trial when either the prosecutor or defense attorney requests a
competency hearing. 152 During trial, mental health may be used to argue
insufficient culpability, as an affirmative defense, and as mitigating
evidence at the sentencing phase. 153 Thus, throughout the procedural
phases of a criminal case, an individual’s mental health problems can be,

People with schizophrenia may hear voices and have other problems that interfere with their ability
to follow directions and behave as expected. In addition, mental illness can evoke fears, hostile
reactions, and negative responses from other inmates and staff. Several studies describe inmates
with mental disorders as having a disruptive effect in a prison environment.”).
148
See MELISSA REULAND & JASON CHENEY, GAINS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE & POLICY
ANALYSIS CTR. FOR JAIL DIVERSION, ENHANCING SUCCESS OF POLICE-BASED DIVERSION
PROGRAMS
FOR
PEOPLE
WITH
MENTAL
ILLNESS
(2005),
available
at
www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=cit2&template=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&
ContentID=65062; Henry J. Steadman et al., A National Survey of Jail Diversion Programs for
Mentally Ill Detainees, 45 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1109, 1109-13 (1994).
149
Officers divert offenders with mental illness from the criminal justice system to
community-based treatment. See REULAND & CHENEY, ENHANCING SUCCESS OF POLICE-BASED
DIVERSION PROGRAMS FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS at 33.
150
Rick Ruddell, Jail Interventions for Inmates with Mental Illnesses, 12 J. CORRECTIONAL
HEALTH CARE 118, 118-31 (2006).
151
Amy Watson et al., Mental Health Courts and the Complex Issue of Mentally Ill
Offenders, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 477, 477-81 (2001).
152
NORMAN POYTHRESS JR. ET AL., 15 ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR
STUDIES (2002).
153
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 et seq.
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and often are, identified, and this information should be passed on to
prison officials.
A formal mechanism should be established to ensure that all
information relating to an inmate’s mental health is collected and
transmitted to the prison. Whenever mental health problems have been
observed prior to or upon entry into prison custody, the inmate should be
provided a mandatory comprehensive psychiatric evaluation by a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or licensed clinician. The evaluator should
have access to all records and reports produced by law enforcement and
court-ordered evaluations, as well as any relevant prior medical
records. 154 As part of the evaluation, the clinician must create a
treatment program and notify prison staff of particular symptoms that
indicate need for immediate treatment. Additionally, medical staff must
regularly monitor individuals with mental health problems to ensure the
treatment provided is adequate and effective. Medical staff should also
provide prison officials with information related to the side effects of
medication and symptoms of medicine toxicity.
B.

MANDATORY AND UNIFORM TRAINING FOR PRISON STAFF

In order for treatment to be both available to and beneficial for
persons with mental illness in custody, prison staff must be trained to
identify symptoms that require acute care. Additionally, in cases in
which symptoms of mental illness are not observed prior to entry into
154

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110
Stat. 1936. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (Westlaw 2012) is implicated by disclosure of medical information
(by a health plan, a health-care clearinghouse or a health-care provider who transmits any health
information in electronic form in connection with a covered transaction); however, 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(e), (f), (j), and (k) provide that disclosures to certain law enforcement officials, courts, and
government agencies may be permissible. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(k)(5) in particular permits
disclosures to correctional institutions and in other law enforcement custodial situations. 45 C.F.R. §
164.512 (k)(5) provides:
(i) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose to a correctional institution or a law
enforcement official having lawful custody of an inmate or other individual protected health
information about such inmate or individual, if the correctional institution or such law
enforcement official represents that such protected health information is necessary for: (A)
The provision of health care to such individuals; (B) The health and safety of such individual
or other inmates; (C) The health and safety of the officers or employees of or others at the
correctional institution; (D) The health and safety of such individuals and officers or other
persons responsible for the transporting of inmates or their transfer from one institution,
facility, or setting to another; (E) Law enforcement on the premises of the correctional
institution; and (F) The administration and maintenance of the safety, security, and good
order of the correctional institution. (ii) Permitted uses. A covered entity that is a correctional
institution may use protected health information of individuals who are inmates for any
purpose for which such protected health information may be disclosed.
45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (k)(5) (Westlaw 2012).
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custody but emerge after a period of time in prison, staff must have
sufficient training to identify symptoms and facilitate referrals for
appropriate evaluations and necessary treatment. Because prison
officials observe and monitor prisoners for security purposes, these
officials have been termed the “gate-keepers” for inmate access to mental
health services. 155 Inmates may not be granted access to necessary
treatment if the officials do not recognize the need. 156 Currently, there
are no uniform mandatory minimum requirements for mental illness
training throughout the prison system, and the result is inconsistent and
ineffective training. 157 A national training standard or certification
requirement is needed for all prison officials who interact with the prison
population. 158
The training required should be designed to provide officials with
sufficient knowledge of mental illness so that the subjective standard of
Farmer has practical meaning as it relates to persons with mental illness.
The minimum standard for all prison staff should include training on
psychosis, recognizing signs of mental illness in younger prisoners
ranging in age from eighteen to twenty-five, 159 and recognizing

155

See Lori A. Marschke, Comment, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for
Mentally Ill Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 487, 523 (2004); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
110 n.3 (1976).
156
See Marschke, Proving Deliberate Indifference: Next to Impossible for Mentally Ill
Inmates, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. at 536-39.
157
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 1, 76 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf.
Currently, mental-health training for security staff is lacking in many states, and in 2001, ten states
reported not providing any training at all. A 2001 report by the National Institute of Corrections
revealed that “[t]en prison systems claimed to include roughly four hours of mental health classes in
their basic training package for new correctional officers, thirteen admitted to providing fewer than
four hours, and only seven stated that they provided more than four hours of training.” NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PROVISION OF MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 9 (2001), available
at http://static.nicic.gov/Library/016724.pdf; see also MIKI VOHRYZEK-BOLDEN, OVERVIEW OF
SELECTED STATES’ ACADEMY AND IN-SERVICE TRAINING FOR ADULT AND JUVENILE
CORRECTIONAL EMPLOYEES 53-61, tbl.9a (1999). California provides a three-hour course on
“unusual inmate behavior.” No other state reported a similar course. Ohio and Tennessee each
offered a course, lasting two and three hours, respectively, titled “managing manipulative inmate
behavior.” Arizona, Nebraska, and Nevada provided officers with a course titled “con games.”
Tennessee offered a three and a half-hour course in “psychological testing.” Under courses on
health and welfare, only eight states—Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and Utah—offered courses specifically on “mental health issues/special needs
inmates.” Aside from Michigan offering sixteen hours of training in this area, all other states ranged
from between one hour and forty-five minutes to six hours.
158
See, e.g., the National Institute of Corrections website, http://nicic.gov/AboutTraining, for
training opportunities for local, state and federal corrections staff.
159
For the majority of mental illnesses, onset occurs between the ages of eighteen and twentyfive. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL (4th ed. 2000).
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symptoms of emergent mental distress among prisoners not previously
identified as mentally ill.
C.

MANDATORY REFERRALS

Whenever an inmate shows symptoms of mental distress, prison
officials should be required to automatically refer the inmate to a trained
clinician. Mandatory referrals would remove the need for prison
officials to make assessments themselves and would safeguard and
insulate officials from liability for deliberate-indifference claims. Prison
officials would be subjected to the possibility of liability only if they
refuse to comply with the mandatory referral protocol. Clinicians would
be able to make appropriate assessments, including testing for
malingering, 160 and to provide treatment plans that serve the needs of the
inmates. Mandatory referrals also would safeguard inmates’ right to
refuse treatment. If an inmate refuses medication, the clinician can make
the assessment of whether the inmate poses a danger to himself or others.
When an inmate does not pose a threat the clinician must comply with
the criteria set forth in Sell. 161 By following mandatory referral
protocols, prison officials would be safeguarded from liability, and
inmates would be provided constitutional protections. Medical staff
would be fully empowered to assess medical necessity, and prison
officials would be able to maintain order without fear of exposing
themselves to liability.
CONCLUSION
The number of persons with mental health problems in prisons and
jails is staggering. Penal institutions have become de facto institutions
for the treatment of persons with mental illness. 162 Whenever an
individual is deprived of liberty by the state and can no longer provide
for his or her own basic needs, the state is obligated to provide necessary
care. For persons with mental illness, basic care includes access to
mental health treatment. Because failing to provide necessary care
violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth

160

Malingering is the intentional fabrication or gross exaggeration of physical or
psychological symptoms in an effort to achieve a goal or avoid a punishment. See id.
161
Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180-81 (2003).
162
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa1003.pdf (“In the
United States, there are three times more mentally ill people in prisons than in mental health
hospitals, and prisoners have rates of mental illness that are two to four times greater than the rates
of members of the general public.”).
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Amendment, there must be mechanisms in place to ensure that adequate
treatment is provided while protecting individual rights.
The Supreme Court has determined that proof of a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting from deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need requires a subjective awareness of the risk of harm. 163 In
order for this subjective standard to have any practical meaning for
persons with mental illness, there must be mandatory psychiatric
evaluations for inmates with a history of mental illness and appropriate
treatment programs designed to accommodate their medical condition.
Prison officials should be provided standardized training in psychosis,
should be provided necessary information from clinical staff about side
effects of individual treatment programs, and should automatically refer
any inmate exhibiting signs of mental distress for clinical assessment and
treatment. These proposals would ensure inmates access to treatment
while protecting their right to refuse treatment. Making referral
mandatory would relieve prison officials from making pseudo-clinical
assessments to determine if referral is necessary and protect the safety of
both inmates and prison officials. Unless an official fails to make the
mandatory referral, she or he will have provided access to treatment,
thereby establishing affirmative proof that she or he is not indifferent to a
serious medical need. Ultimately, these proposed changes would protect
persons with mental illness from cruel and unusual punishment by
establishing procedures to mitigate the invisibility of their illness while
insulating prison officials from liability on inmate claims of deliberate
indifference. Increasing access to diagnosis and treatment would
diminish unintended suffering. As a final protective mechanism, if a
person in custody needs to seek redress from the courts, these proposals
would reduce some of the barriers that inmates with mental illness face
in challenging constitutional violations.

163

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826 (1994).
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